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THE

2000 DRAFT OF UCC ARTICLE 2:
PART SIX ON BREACH,
REPUDIATION, AND ExCUSE
Christina L. Kunz*

N the continuing redraft process of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the 2000 Annual Meeting draft' was the most
recent work product at the time this article was written. It was
drafted for consideration at the 2000 annual meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).2 This article will refer to the existing U.C.C. as the "current Code" and to the
2000 Annual Meeting draft as the "2000 draft." The 2000 draft is carefully drafted and well balanced. Its changes are needed to enable U.C.C.
Article 2 to guide and facilitate commercial law during the next halfcentury.
Part Six of Article 2 deals with breach, repudiation, and excuse in the
sale of goods. It is closely related to-and sometimes intertwined withthe performance provisions of Part Five. In other respects, Part Six is a
close cousin to Part Seven's remedies because it sets out many rights and
responsibilities of the aggrieved party. In the 2000 draft, Part Six has
been revised to clarify buyer's post-rejection duties and rights; buyer's
reasonable use of goods after rejection or revocation; buyer's failure to
particularize after revocation; notice of breach as to accepted goods; installment contracts; anticipatory repudiation; contract avoidance, termination, and lapse; and the scope of the impracticability excuse. These
changes are minor and mostly follow existing case law or common sense.
In general, Part Six has been a source of little controversy during the
revision process.

*Professor
of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. The author has been a member of the ABA Subcommittee on UCC Article 2 since Spring of 1994, has attended nearly
every meeting of the NCCUSL's drafting committee on UCC Article 2 since then as an
Observer to the NCCUSL process, and has contributed suggestions and criticisms during
the drafting process. She also is the co-chair of the ABA Working Group on Electronic
Contracting Practices.
1. The text and comments of the July 2000 draft and other drafts can be found at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-frame.htm.
2. For the current status of NCCUSL uniform acts in the legislatures, as well as other
current information, see http://www.nccusl.org.
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BUYER'S POST-REJECTION DUTIES AND OPTIONS

Sections 2-602, 2-603, and 2-604 set out buyer's post-rejection duties
and options. In the'3 current Code, the captions limit each section to
"rightful rejection." However, this approach leaves unanswered the
question of what duties the buyer has as to goods rejected wrongfully but
effectively. The sensible solution is to apply many of these post-rejection
duties and options to all effective rejections, 4 both wrongful and rightful.
The 2000 draft accomplishes that result by changing the captions of these
'5
sections to apply to "rejection," rather than only "rightful rejection."
Thus, if buyer effectively rejects the goods (rightfully or wrongfully) by
seasonably notifying seller of rejection, buyer has a duty to hold any
goods in its possession with reasonable care at seller's disposition, 6 sometimes has a duty to make reasonable efforts to resell the goods or to follow seller's reasonable instructions, 7 and otherwise has the options of
resale, storage, or reshipment. 8
The 2000 draft then accordingly limits buyer's right to indemnity or
reimbursement for expenses under Section 2-603(a) and (b) to rightfully
rejected goods:
(a) Subject to any security interest in the buyer under Section 2711(c), when the seller has no agent or place of business at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after rejection of
goods in its possession or control to follow any reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to the goods and in the
absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them
for the seller's account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in
value speedily. In the case of a rightful rejection instructions are not
reasonable if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming.
(b) When the buyer sells goods under subsection (a) following a
rightful rejection, the buyer is entitled to reimbursement from the
seller or out of the proceeds for reasonable expenses of caring for
and selling them, and if the expenses include no selling commission
then to such commission as is usual in the trade or if there is none to
a reasonable sum not exceeding 10 percent on the gross proceeds. 9
Thus, in both (a) and (b), the buyer who rightfully rejects is mitigating
its own damages and is entitled to recover the expenses of mitigation,
which also might well be recoverable as incidental damages. 10 However,
the buyer who wrongfully but effectively rejects is (by implication)1 1 not
3.
4.
U.C.C.
5.

U.C.C. §§ 2-602 to -604 (1999).
Recall that an ineffective rejection is an acceptance. U.C.C. § 2-606(l)(b) (1999);
§ 2-606(a)(2) (2000 draft).
U.C.C. §§ 2-602 to 2-604 (2000 draft).

6. Id. § 2-602(b)(2).

7. Id. § 2-603(a).
8. Id. § 2-604.
9. Id. § 2-603(a), (b) (emphasis added).
10. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1999) (defining incidental damages).

11. The Reporter's Notes state that the "text has been modified to make it clear that a
buyer is not entitled to indemnity for expenses (subsection (a)) or to a commission (subsection (b)) following a wrongful rejection." U.C.C. § 2-603 Reporter's Notes (2000 draft).
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entitled to indemnity or reimbursement because the breaching buyer has
no right to any damages, but instead is responsible for seller's resale 12 or
market damages1 3 or, in special cases, the price. 14 The higher the buyer's
resale price, the less buyer's damages will be, if the seller chooses to use
(or must use) resale as the basis for calculating damages; 15 if so, the
wrongfully rejecting buyer has an incentive to sell the goods for as high a
price as possible.
Of course, the wrongfully rejecting buyer, at the time of resale, often
believes that it is in the right, so it might well demand that seller include
indemnity for expenses in its instructions under Section 2-603(a). If the
seller refuses to do so because it believes, correctly, that buyer is in the
wrong, buyer might erroneously conclude that seller's instructions are
"not reasonable" under the last sentence in (a) and therefore refuse to
follow those instructions, even though later facts show that buyer was
indeed obligated to follow those instructions, because it was not entitled
to indemnity for expenses as a wrongfully rejecting buyer. 16 Alternatively, the wrongfully rejecting buyer might erroneously conclude that it
is entitled to reimbursement out of the resale proceeds and forward to
seller only part of the resale proceeds. Seller would then have to convince buyer that rejection was wrongful, in order to recover the rest of
the resale proceeds.
Thus, the 2000 revision of Section 2-603 answers the larger question of
the duties of the wrongfully rejecting buyer; the remaining questions will
The revised section, however, states only the rights of the rightfully rejecting buyer and by
omission attempts to imply that the wrongfully rejecting buyer does not have the same
rights.
In the 2000 draft, the Prefatory Note states:
Due to time constraints, Preliminary Comments have been prepared only for
those sections that are either new or controversial. Other sections contain
only limited Reporter's Notes explaining the changes-the Comments for
these sections will be based primarily on the Official Comments to current
Article 2. For sections where there are either no changes or only minor style
changes, the Reporter's Notes state "[t]his section reflects current law."
U.C.C. art. 2, prefatory note (2000 draft). This article cites both as "comments" to the 2000
draft.
12. See U.C.C. § 2-706 (1999).
13. See id. § 2-708(1).
14. See id. § 2-709.
15. Article 2, its drafting history, applicable cases, and commentary are inconclusive or
split as to whether an aggrieved seller can freely elect between §§ 2-706 and 2-708(1) after
buyer wrongfully fails to accept. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-7, at 376-83 (4th ed. Vol. 1 1995) (Practitioner Treatise Series).
The 2000 draft states, "Failure of a seller to resell within this section does not bar the seller
from any other remedy." U.C.C. § 2-706(g) (2000 draft). Comment 10 to § 2-706 states
that "seller is always free to choose between resale and damages for repudiation or nonacceptance under Section 2-708." Id. § 2-706 cmt. 10.
16. Comment 1 to § 2-603 in the current Code denotes buyer's resale under subsection
(1) as "a salvage sale where the value of the goods is threatened and the seller's instructions do not arrive in time to prevent serious loss." Comment 5 states that a buyer who
fails to effect that salvage sale "is subject to damages" under the policies set forth in § 1106. U.C.C. § 2-603 cmts. 1, 5 (1999). By close analogy, seller's remedy for buyer's failure
to follow reasonable instructions under § 2-603 should be the same.
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eventually be resolved between the parties as they sort out whether the
rejection was in fact wrongful or rightful.
B.

BUYER'S REASONABLE USE OF GOODS AFTER
REJECTION OR REVOCATION

The current Code states that a revoking buyer "has the same rights and
7
duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.'
This broad reference has been understood to apply Sections 2-602 (manner and effect of rejection), 2-603 (merchant buyer's duties as to rejected
goods), and 2-604 (buyer's options as to salvage of rejected goods) to
revocation situations. 18 Nothing in the 2000 draft disturbs this understanding. In addition, in the 2000 draft, under Section 2-602(b), an aggrieved buyer's duties as to rejected or revoked goods are subject to
Section 2-608(d), a new subsection,' 9 which states the following:
If a buyer uses the goods after a rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance, the following rules apply:
(1) Any use by the buyer that is unreasonable under the circumstances is wrongful as against the seller and is an acceptance only if
ratified by the seller.
(2) Any use of the goods that is reasonable under the circumstances
is not wrongful as against the seller and is not an acceptance, but in
an appropriate case the buyer 20shall be obligated to the seller for the
value of the use to the buyer.
Comment 7 adds the following explanation:
Subsection (d), which is new, deals with the problem of post-rejection or revocation use of the goods. The courts have developed several alternative approaches. Under original Article 2, a buyer's postrejection or revocation use of the goods could be treated as an acceptance, thus undoing the rejection or revocation, could be a violation of the buyer's obligation of reasonable care, or could be a
reasonable use for which the buyer must compensate the seller. Subsection (d) adopts the third approach. If the buyer's use after an effective rejection or a justified revocation of acceptance is
unreasonable under the circumstances, it is inconsistent with the rejection or revocation of acceptance and is wrongful as against the
seller. This gives the seller the option of ratifying the use, thereby
treating it as an acceptance, or pursuing a non-Code remedy for
conversion.
If the buyer's use is reasonable under the circumstances, the
buyer's actions cannot be treated as an acceptance. The buyer must
compensate the seller for the value of the use of the goods to the
buyer. Determining the appropriate level of compensation requires
a consideration of the buyer's particular circumstances and should
17. U.C.C. § 2-608(3) (1999).
18. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM D.

HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

608:1 (1998 & Supp. 2000).
19. See U.C.C. §8 2-602(b), 2-608(d) (2000 draft).
20. Id. § 2-608(d).

CODE SERIES

§ 2-
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take into account the defective condition of the goods. There may be
circumstances, such as where the use is solely for the purpose of protecting the buyer's security interest in the goods, where no compensation is due the seller. In other circumstances, the seller's right to
compensation
must be netted out against any right of the buyer to
21
damages.
Section 2-606 on acceptance contains a new cross-reference to this new
22
provision.
The breaching seller's right to the value of buyer's post-rejection or
post-revocation use is consistent with the law of restitution (incorporated
into the UCC under Section 1-103),23 some case law,2 4 the recommendations of several commentators,2 5 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act. 26 In most instances, the breaching seller will be setting off the value
of buyer's use against damages or the return of the prepaid purchase
price.
Although earlier drafts of a very similar section included wrongful but
effective rejections,2 7 Section 2-608(d) in the 2000 draft limits the rule to
rightful rejections and justifiable revocations, but does not explain the
rationale for the scope of the rule.
C.

BUYER'S FAILURE TO PARTICULARIZE DEFECTS

In the current Code, buyer's failure to particularize defects under section 2-605(1) precludes the buyer from relying on that unstated defect to
justify rejection or establish breach only if (1) a merchant seller makes a
written request of a merchant buyer for a written statement of all defects
that triggered the rejection or (2) "seller could have cured it if stated
seasonably. '28 The 2000 draft rewords the second point as follows:
"where the seller had a right to cure the defect and could have cured it if
stated seasonably. '29 Thus, seller must have both the right and the ability
to cure. Otherwise, the argument might be made that Section 2-605 cre21. Id. § 2-608 cmt. 7. This language would be clearer if the fourth and fifth sentences
read: "Subsection (d) adopts the third approach as to reasonable use. However, if the
buyer's use after an effective rejection or a justified revocation of acceptance is unreasonable ..
" (additional language underlined).
22. Id. § 2-606(a)(3).
23. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQuITY-RESTITUTION
§ 5.15(2), at 563-64 (2d ed. 1993).
24. See, e.g., Page v. Dobbs Mobile Bay, Inc., 599 So. 2d 38 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992);
Stroh v. Am. Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 530 P.2d 989, 993 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
25. See, e.g., R.J. Robertson, Jr., Rights and Obligations of Buyers with Respect to
Goods in Their Possession After Rightful Rejection or Justifiable Revocation of Acceptance,
60 IND. L.J. 663, 679-94 (1984); Douglas J. Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The UCC's "TARR"-Baby, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 52, 65 (1974); Kim Michael La
Valle, Note, Buyer's Continued Use of Goods After Revocation of Acceptance Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1371, 1382 (1978).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(12) (1994); See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 8-3, at
453 n.40 (related FTC developments).
27. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-704(b) (Tentative Draft Dec. 1998).
28. U.C.C. § 2-605(1)(a) (1999).
29. U.C.C. § 2-605(a)(1) (2000 draft); cf. U.C.C. § 2-605(1)(a) (1999) ("where the
seller could have cured it if stated seasonably").
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ates additional instances in which seller can cure, aside from those al30
lowed under Section 2-508 which deals with cure. It does not.
Consistent with the idea that a revoking buyer "has the same rights and
duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them," the
2000 draft extends the scope of Section 2-605 (waiver of buyer's objections by failure to particularize) to cover revocation of acceptance. 3 1 The
2000 draft further expands Section 2-605's applicability to revocation by
enlarging the scope of cure to apply to some revocation situations: nonconsumer contracts 32 in which the revocation was based on non-discovery
of the nonconformity. 33 Within this set of factual constraints, if cure is
possible, buyer must particularize that defect or be barred from relying
on it to justify revocation.
However, if buyer revokes acceptance because seller has not cured a
defect, the 2000 draft does not give seller a second chance to cure after
revocation. 34 Thus, buyer need not particularize defects under subsection
(a)(1) after revocation if the revocation was based on seller's failure to
cure. 35 However, that same buyer may still have to particularize defects
under subsection (a)(2) if both buyer and seller are merchants and if
seller makes a written request for a written statement of defects. 36 This
addition goes unmentioned in the comment to the 2000 draft of Section
2-605 but is a sensible result, because it continues the policy of treating
30. See U.C.C. § 2-605 cmt. 1 (2000 draft).
31. U.C.C. § 2-605(a) (2000 draft) states:
The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a particular defect or
in connection with revocation of acceptance a defect that justifies revocation
precludes the buyer from relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection or
revocation of acceptance if the defect is ascertainable by reasonable
inspection:
(1) where the seller had a right to cure the defect and could have cured it if
stated seasonably; or
(2) between merchants when the seller has after rejection or revocation of
acceptance made a request in a record for a full and final written statement
of all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely.
32. A "consumer contract" is a "contract between a merchant seller and a consumer."
U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(12) (2000 draft). A "consumer" is "an individual that buys or contracts
to buy goods that, at the time of contracting, are intended by the individual to be used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." Id. § 2-102(a)(11). This definition
means that a contract in which both buyer and seller are consumers is a "non-consumer
contract" and therefore subject to cure after a revocation that is based on non-discovery of
the nonconformity. However, that result is contrary to the following statement in § 2-605
cmt. 1 (2000 draft): "[B]ecause the right to cure following revocation of acceptance is restricted under Section 2-508 to nonconsumer contracts, this section cannot be asserted
against a consumer who is seeking to revoke acceptance."
33. See U.C.C. §§ 2-508, 2-608(a)(2) (2000 draft). For further discussion of this
change, see Patricia A. Tauchert, A Survey of Part5 of Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV.
_ (2001).
34. See U.C.C. § 2-508 (2000 draft) (limiting cure after revocation to instances in
which buyer accepted the goods "without discovery of such nonconformity if the buyer's
acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance
or by the seller's assurances," per § 2-608(a)(2)).
35. See id. § 2-605 cmt. 1.
36. Id. § 2-605 cmt. 1 does not note this latter possibility. This omission is remedied in
the edited comment in text accompanying infra note 43.
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rejections and revocations alike, insofar as it is possible and justifiable.
There is no reason to deny a merchant seller an itemized statement of
defects from a merchant buyer who has revoked acceptance of the goods,
as long as the same statement is available when the goods have been
37
rejected.
As to either rejection or revocation, buyer's failure to particularize a
defect precludes buyer from using this defect to justify rejection or revocation. However, the 2000 draft, would no longer bar the buyer from
establishing breach to obtain other remedies. 38 After all, the rationales
for requiring buyer to particularize defects as to rejected goods are to
enable seller to cure, to enable seller to resolve a dispute about an alleged
defect, to deter buyers from bad-faith rejections, and to give seller the
ability to police the buyer's damages claim. 39 If buyer instead has accepted the defective goods, buyer must give notice of breach (but not
defects) 40 under Section 2-607.41 However, if that same buyer then revokes acceptance and falls within either of the instances for particularizing defects, the buyer must state the defect discovered after acceptance,
42
in order to use that defect to justify revocation.
In the 2000 draft, the last paragraph of comment 1 accompanying Section 2-605 could use some tightening up, for clarity and for consistency
with the points made above. Recommended additions and deletions are
shown below in italics and strikeout:
Subsection (a) as revised has been extended to include not only rejection but also revocation of acceptance. This is necessitated by the
expansion of the right to cure (Section 2-508) to cover revocation of
acceptance in nonconsumer contracts. The application of the subsection to revocation cases is limited in the following ways: (1) because
a revocation under Section 2-608(a)(1) does not trigger a right to
cure under Section 2-508, such a revocation does not trigger Section
2-605(a)(1), but it could trigger Section 2-605(a); (2) if there is the
requisite written request between merchants because Section 237. "When the time for cure is past, subsection (1)(b) makes it plain that a seller is
entitled upon request to a final statement of objections upon which he can rely." U.C.C.
§ 2-605 cmt. 3 (1999).
38. Compare U.C.C. § 2-605(1) (1999) ("precludes him from relying on the unstated
defect to justify rejection or to establish breach") with U.C.C. § 2-605(a) (2000 draft)
("precludes the buyer from relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection or revocation
of acceptance").
39. See U.C.C. § 2-605 cmts. 1, 2 (1999).
40. Id. § 2-607 cmt. 4 states as follows:
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller
know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched. There is
no reason to require that the notification which saves the buyer's rights
under this section must include a clear statement of all the objections that
will be relied on by the buyer, as under the section covering statements of
defects upon rejection (Section 2-605) .... The notification which saves the
buyer's rights under this Article need only be such as informs the seller that
the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens the way for
normal settlement through negotiation.
41. See U.C.C. § 2-605 cmt. 1 (2000 draft).
42. See id. § 2-605.
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608(a)(2) involves defects that are by definition difficult to discover,
there is no waiver under Section 2-605(a) unless the defect at issue
justifies the revocation and the buyer has notice of it; and (3) because the right to cure following revocation of acceptance is restricted under Section 2-508 to nonconsumer contracts and because
Section 2-605(a)(2) applies only between merchants, this section cannot be asserted against a consumer who is seeking to revoke acceptance. The consequences of a consumer's failure to give proper notice
are governed by Section 2-607(c) as to accepted goods and Section 2602(a) as to
goods subject to buyer's attempt to reject or revoke
43
acceptance.
These changes clarify the related sections for some of the subsection
references, the relationship between various combinations of consumers
and merchants, and the relationship between the notices for accepted
goods versus rejected or revoked goods.
D.

NOTICE OF BREACH AS TO ACCEPTED GOODS

Under Section 2-607 of the current Code, a buyer who has accepted the
goods "must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy."'44 This provision has been the subject of scholarly criticism because of its harshness in completely barring the remedies of a buyer who
fails to give timely notice. 45 The 2000 draft instead states that "buyer
must ... notify the seller; however, failure to give timely notice bars the

buyer from a remedy only to the extent that the seller is prejudiced by the
failure."'46 The accompanying Comment states that the change means
that
a failure to give timely notice is reduced to a prejudice rule instead of
an absolute bar to any recovery as under the original provision. A
Comment will specify that the buyer must be in good faith in not
giving notice, and that the buyer cannot come back after
the buyer's
47
own default and claim that the seller was in breach.
Although both the current Code and the 2000 draft place the burden
"on the buyer to establish any breach," 48 the 2000 draft places on the
seller the burden to show to what extent it was prejudiced by the buyer's
43. Id. § 2-605 cmt. 1 (edits added by author); see also supra note 32, which raises an

additional inconsistency.
44. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1999); see also supra note 40 for the text of an accompanying comment.
45. See generally John C. Reitz, Against Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of
Claims Rule in U.C.C. 2-607(3)(a), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 534 (1988).
46. U.C.C. § 2-607(c)(1) (2000 draft). This provision states in full:
Where a tender has been accepted
(1) the buyer must within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or
should have discovered any breach notify the seller; however, failure to
give timely notice bars the buyer from a remedy only to the extent that the
seller is prejudiced by the failure.

47. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. (2000 draft).
48. U.C.C. § 2-607(4) (1999); U.C.C. § 2-607(d) (2000 draft).
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failure to give notice of breach. Buyer's failure to give notice might
prejudice seller in ways unrelated to buyer's damages, for example,
preventing seller from "pass[ing] liability for breach on to suppliers or
carriers because of [the] expiration of the applicable limitations period '49
or preventing seller from "avoid[ing] similar liability to other buyers of
the same or similar products." 50 However, by far the most likely
prejudice to seller is liability for all or part of buyer's damages claimed
under Section 2-714, which seller might have been able to avoid by negotiating a settlement with buyer (perhaps of a money allowance, repair, or
replacement) or by examining the defective goods to determine to what
extent they were actually nonconforming upon tender or receipt, failed to
live up to seller's promises as to future performance, or had been damaged by buyer's inappropriate use, failure to follow instructions, or other
negligence.
If the goods have been disposed of (by buyer's sale or by destruction)
and are no longer available for seller's examination, the seller might be
able to claim complete prejudice if it has no separate basis for contesting
the buyer's proof of the breach (assuming, of course, that the buyer can
meet its burden of establishing the breach, based on evidence taken
before the goods became unavailable for examination). If buyer still has
the goods, the seller might be prejudiced by its difficulty in determining
whether or to what extent buyer tampered with the goods. If the buyer
has continued to use the goods, the seller might have a hard time showing
the extent to which the alleged defects were caused by buyer's continuing
use (or misuse).
However, some of these proof problems could be alleviated if a court is
willing to decrease the buyer's damages by the amount that the goods
might have deteriorated between the time seller should have received notice and the time seller did finally receive notice (perhaps upon notice of
litigation). One commentator, Professor Reitz, has proposed that
[a]ny lingering concerns about the possibility of prejudice from loss
of evidence can be eliminated by granting the seller a rebuttable presumption that specific evidence the seller lost as a result of the
buyer's delay would have refuted the buyer's claim ....

The seller

could not claim the presumption unless it could prove that, as a result of the buyer's delayed notice, it lost the chance to obtain or preserve a specific source of evidence relevant to the breach issue that
the seller would not normally have obtained or preserved in the absence of a dispute ....

The factfinder could weigh that presumption

against the credibility of the buyer's [evidence].
This approach concedes that the mere loss of potentially significant evidence is a prejudice to the seller but avoids the extreme of shielding the
seller from liability in cases in which the available evidence strongly indicates that the seller did breach. The presumption formalizes whatever
49. Reitz, supra note 45, at 558.
50. Id.
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negative inference a factfinder would draw when the buyer's delay in giving notice prevents the seller from obtaining potential rebuttal evidence.
Although this approach still overprotects the seller by giving the seller
the benefit of a presumption even when the available evidence indicates
that the seller in fact breached, it also allows the trier of fact to consider
whether the available evidence overcomes the presumption. The alternative of requiring the seller to prove actual harm from loss of evidence
would pose an impossible burden of proof for the seller, and the alternative of requiring the seller to demonstrate a likelihood that lost evidence
would have supported the seller's defense would in effect require the
court to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence anyway,
thus eliminating any protection from the potential prejudice. Requiring
the seller to identify specific sources of lost evidence, on the other hand,
does not unduly burden the seller because the seller should be able to
identify51 the sources of evidence it could have obtained if notified
earlier.
The addition of comment language affirming Professor Reitz's idea of a
rebuttable presumption would alleviate the unfairness to a seller who has
been prejudiced by buyer's delay in depriving seller of a valuable opportunity to obtain evidence.
Subsection 2-607(5) in the current Code covers buyer's notice about
being "sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for which his
seller is answerable over."152 In the 2000 draft, the vouching in process in
Section 2-607(e) applies when "buyer is sued for indemnity, breach of a
warranty or other obligation for which another party [including seller] is
answerable over. ' '53 This revision reflects the increased contractual use
of indemnification, third-party54warranties, the duty to defend, and other
similar contractual provisions.
51. Reitz, supra note 45, at 568-69 (footnotes omitted).
52. U.C.C. § 2-607(5) (1999).
53. U.C.C. § 2-607(e) (2000 draft). The whole provision states as follows:
Where the buyer is sued for indemnity, breach of a warranty or other obligation for which another party is answerable over
(1) the buyer may give the other party notice of the litigation in a record.
If the notice states that the other party may come in and defend and that if
the other party does not do so it will be bound in any action against it by
the buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigations, then
unless the other party after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in
and defend it is so bound.
(2) if the claim is one for infringement or the like the original seller may
demand in a record that its buyer turn over to it control of the litigation
including settlement or else be barred from any remedy over and if it also
agrees to bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then unless
the buyer after seasonable receipt of the demand does turn over control
the buyer is so barred.
54. A comment to a previous draft of the same section adds clarification:
Vouching in does not confer a right on the party notified to intervene, does
not confer jurisdiction of any kind on the court over the person answerable
over, and does not create a duty to defend on the part of the person answerable over. Those matters continue to be governed by the applicable rules of
civil procedure and substantive law outside this section. Vouching in is based
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E.

INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS

In the 2000 draft, the definition of "installment contract" has been
moved from Section 2-612(1) to Section 2-102(a)(28), as part of the collection of Article 2 definitions.
In addition, both subsections of Section 2-508 on cure are revised to
include explicit references to rejection under either Section 2-601 (noninstallment contracts) or Section 2-612 (installment contracts). 55 This
56
change is consistent with existing case law and commentary.
In the 2000 draft of Section 2-612 on installment contracts, the phrase
"to the buyer" is added to (a) and (b): "(a) [T]he buyer may reject any
installment that is nonconforming if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of that installment to the buyer .... (b) Whenever nonconformity or default with respect to one or more installments
substantially impairs the value of the whole contract to the buyer .... -57
These additions clarify that the "substantial impairment" test of Section
2-612 is meant not to be a purely objective test based on the needs of the
usual buyer or even seller's knowledge about buyer's needs at the time of
contract formation. This result is consistent with a comment of the current Code, 58 current commentary, 59 the Restatement factors determining
whether a breach is material, 60 and the standard for revocation of acceptance. 61 Section 2-608 on revocation of acceptance includes "to the
buyer" in both the current Code and the 2000 draft.62 The comment to
the current Code states as follows:
the test is not what the seller had reason to know at the time of
contracting; the question is whether the non-conformity is such as
will in fact cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer
though the seller had
no advance knowledge as to the buyer's partic63
ular circumstances.
This test does not mean that buyer can revoke acceptance based solely
on personal dissatisfaction, but it does allow buyer to prove "his own special needs and the particular use to which he intended to put the
upon the principle that the person answerable over is liable for its contractual obligations regarding the quality or title to the goods which the buyer is
being forced to defend. U.C.C. § 2-707 cmt. 7 (Tentative Draft Dec. 1998).
55. U.C.C. § 2-508(a), (b) (2000 draft).
56. See HAWKLAND, supra note 18, § 2-612:3 & n.2; WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE & WILLIAM H. HENNING, UNDERSTANDING SALES AND LEASES OF GOODS § 7.04[E], at 217
(1996).
57. U.C.C. § 2-612 (2000 draft) (emphasis added).
58. See U.C.C. § 2-612 cmt. 4 (1999) ("Substantial impairment of the value of an installment.., must be judged in terms of the normal or specifically known purposes of the
contract.").
59. See HAWKLAND, supra note 18, § 2-612:3 & n.3; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 15,
§ 8-3.
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979).
61. See U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1999) ("non-conformity substantially impairs its value to
[buyer]").
62. U.C.C. § 2-608(a) (2000 draft).
63. U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 2 (1999).
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goods."'64 Usually, this test involves comparing
the dollar value of the defect (as measured by the particular credible
needs of the buyer) with the price paid for the goods. If the defect
can be corrected, its dollar value is simply the cost of effecting the
cure. Whether that cost is sufficiently substantial to permit the buyer
to revoke acceptance, as opposed to recovering the cost by way of
damages, depends upon its magnitude as compared to the price of
nothing to do with the financial resources of the
the goods, and has
65
particular buyer.
If Sections 2-608 and 2-612 use the same language ("substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer"), the considerably more extensive cases and commentary concerning Section 2-608 will be available to
clarify that same language in Section 2-612.
F.

ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION

The 2000 draft of Section 2-610 clarifies that repudiation includes "language that a reasonable party would interpret to mean that the other
party will not or cannot make a performance still due under the contract," as well as "voluntary, affirmative conduct that would appear to a
reasonable party to make a future performance by the other party impossible."' 66 This clarification is based on the Restatement (Second) provision on repudiation, 67 which states:
A repudiation is (a) a statement by the obligor to the obligee indicating that the obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give the
obligee a claim for damages for a total breach under § 243, or (b) a
unable or apparvoluntary affirmative act which renders the obligor
68
ently unable to perform without such a breach.
However, it may actually be a bit narrower than a comment in the current Code, which states that "[it is not necessary for repudiation that
performance be made literally and utterly impossible. Repudiation can
result from action which reasonably indicates a rejection of the continuing obligation. '69 The question left open by the 2000 draft is whether an
action (not a statement) indicating obligor is unwilling (but not 70unable) to
perform is still a repudiation, as it is under the current Code.
G.

CONTRACT AVOIDANCE, TERMINATION, AND LAPSE

In the current Code, the consequence of meeting the requirements of
Section 2-613 on casualty losses is that the contract is "avoided," as a
64.

HAWKLAND,

supra note 18, § 2-608:2, at art. 2-130.

65. Id. art. 2-131.

66. U.C.C. § 2-610(b) (2000 draft).
67. U.C.C. § 2-613 cmt. 1 (1996) states that the "working but not exclusive definition
of repudiation [is] taken from § 250 of the Restatement, Second of Contracts."
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1979).
69. U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 2 (1999).
70. See HAWKLAND, supra note 18, § 2-610:2.
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whole or in part.71 The 2000 draft instead states that the contract is "terminated," as a whole or in part, in order to preserve pre-termination
breaches that otherwise might be wiped out if "avoidance" is taken to
mean rescission of the contract. Termination is defined as occurring
when "either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or law puts
an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. ' 72 The effect of
termination is that "all obligations which are still executory on both sides
are discharged but any right based on prior breach or performance
survives. "73
A similar change is made in Section 2-616, which sets out the procedure
on notice claiming excuse. The current Code states that the "contract
lapses" when the buyer does not agree to modify the contract according
to seller's proposed substitute
quota.7 4 The 2000 draft instead states, "the
'75
contract is terminated.

H.

SCOPE OF IMPRACTICABILITY EXCUSE

Section 2-615 on the excuse of impracticability is expanded from a
"[d]elay in delivery or non-delivery" in the current Code to a "[d]elay in
performance or nonperformance" in the 2000 draft.76 The same change
in terminology is made in the next section on the procedure for claiming
excuse. 77 This change allows sellers to use the impracticability excuse
78
with regard to all of their obligations, not just the obligation of delivery.
I.

CONCLUSION

The changes to Part Six in the 2000 draft to U.C.C. Article 2 are useful
changes that are consistent with existing law or clear up existing
problems. Aside from some minor edits in text and some additions to
comments, this part of the draft is ready for adoption by NCCUSL.

71.
72.
73.
74.

U.C.C. § 2-613 (1999).
Id. § 2-106(3); U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(38) (2000 draft).
U.C.C. § 2-106(3) (1999); U.C.C. § 2-106 (2000 draft).
U.C.C. § 2-616(2) (1999).

75. U.C.C. § 2-616(b) (2000 draft). The comments accompanying the draft state that
the current Code uses the term "avoidance," but that is incorrect. The current Code uses
the term "lapse."
76. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1999); U.C.C. § 2-615(1) (2000 draft).
77. See U.C.C. § 2-616 (1999); U.C.C § 2-616 (2000 draft).
78. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. (2000 draft).
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